In late 2000, the Colorado Rockies coveted Mike Hampton. They were ready to take the team to the next level. They tired of watching the LA Dodgers dominate the division. The telecom boom was the best thing that happened to the Colorado economy since the gold rushes of the 1800s. With a baseball dynasty, the Colorado Rockies would tap into this new found wealth.

However, Mike Hampton was not a well-kept secret. After all, he had just been named MVP of the 2000 National League Championship Series. Bottom line—the Rockies were among many who wanted Mike Hampton to wear their uniform in 2001. Yankees? Mets? Cubs? Red Sox? Angels? Phillies? No question most were sniffing around.

Imagine if you approached Hampton’s agent with the following idea? “We are proposing a success-based contract. For every win, we will pay you $3M. But for every loss, we will deduct $1M. If you average just five more wins than losses, you’ll make $10M a year. We will even guarantee a minimum of $5M in each of the first two years.”

Does that sound reasonable? After all, $10M is a ton of money in any circumstance. Moreover, Hampton’s job includes several months off a year and, during the work week, he is expected to work only 1 or 2 days. And he can take side jobs—commercials, autograph signings. And if he has another 22-4 year, he will make $36M in that year alone!!!

My guess is Hampton’s agent would not have found such an offer worthy of a response. Nope. The agent knew that others would offer more. Hampton was a uniquely valuable asset. He was entering the prime of his career. His impact on attendance, TV ratings, merchandise, etc. would be in the millions. Why would he consider a success-based contract that, if things go astray, could result in him receiving only $10M? The agent would set expectations early. Only a contract with many guaranteed years would be considered. And if the aggregate guarantee wasn’t in the nine figures, no need to waste time in the bidding war.

How much is Hampton worth? Is $90M over six years a good deal? $100M over seven? $122M over eight? How much more valuable will the Colorado Rockies franchise be with Hampton? If the value goes up by $200M, the Rockies owners will be glad to have spent the $122M. What are the alternatives? If we spent $50M on a decent pitcher and another $50M on a solid shortstop, perhaps we would be just as valuable.

Excel spreadsheets were hard at work. Not just in Colorado, but in New York, Chicago, and plenty of other major league cities. The math they did undoubtedly was about making money for the stakeholders. It did NOT factor in pride, ego, community benefits, etc. The spreadsheets were aimed at comparing the value that would be gained if Hampton was signed as compared to other alternative ways of operating the baseball team.

The math factored in the possibility of injury. The equations used baseball’s decades of statistics on how to project future performance based on past results. Assumptions were made. NPV’s were tabulated. Negotiators were given parameters. Some teams decided not to bid. Others dropped out when the bids hit $90M. Others at $100M. At the end, the Rockies were willing to offer the most—and Mike Hampton donned the purple and black.

Did emotion factor into the decision? No question it did. Baseball owners are driven by the pride of winning. Maybe this influenced certain assumptions. Maybe their motive to make as much money as possible for their stakeholders was somewhat compromised. At the end of the day, the decision-makers are human, not computers. However, this is not unique to baseball.

Tomorrow, let’s ponder a related question “How much is “The Best Operating CEO Jack Welch Has Ever Seen” Worth?”

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Jack Welch, who is known as the greatest CEO ever, referred to Robert Nardelli as “the best operating executive I’ve ever seen”. In the late 1990s—while Mike Hampton was posting a 37-14 record–Jack Welch was nearing the end of his fabled career. Welch needed to pick his successor. Baseball teams need five starting pitchers. Corporations need only one CEO. And Jack had more than one good one to choose among.

“I had to go with my gut,” Welch told Robert Nardelli in November 2000 when he passed Nardelli over and instead selected Jeff Immelt. So in November 2000, exactly one month after Mike Hampton’s contract expired with the New York Mets, Nardelli joined Hampton as a employee without a team. Yes, Nardelli was a free agent.

Timing was good for Robert. As the runner up in the highly publicized CEO derby, he was well known as one of the best executives in the world. With the Nasdaq roaring at 4,000, his expertise would be sorely coveted. Hampton was a left hander just entering the prime of his career. At the age of 52, Robert was (in his profession) also entering the prime of his career. Like Hampton, the next contract he signed would be the pivotal one.

How did Robert become recognized as a top-notch CEO candidate? Let’s start with Nardelli’s career prior to his ascent at GE, courtesy of Fortune magazine article titled Something to Prove.

A mediocre student, Nardelli got B’s and C’s in school, but he hustled and excelled outside the classroom. He was an altar boy, a Boy Scout, a star athlete, editor of the yearbook, a class officer, and an ROTC cadet. At Western Illinois, no football player prepped harder than Nardelli, the co-captain and fierce offensive guard. “He was always the first in to study the films of the games,” says his coach, Bob McMahan. “He was one of the few kids who really cared that he was carrying his load and doing right.” Football gave Nardelli his first lesson in Six Sigma quality control, which became his gospel at GE: “Everybody had to do his job impeccably well. A case of ‘we all win or we all lose.’ “

Nardelli sold his motorcycle to raise the cash to buy an engagement ring for his college girlfriend, Sue, and they married in 1971, the year they graduated. And after rejecting the idea of becoming a football coach because he was wary of the unpredictability of the profession, Nardelli started at GE that same year at the lowest salaried level, as a $9,600-a-year manufacturing engineer. He worked his way up, taking night MBA classes at the University of Louisville. Jack Welch, who met Nardelli in the late 1970s, says that the young man hounded him relentlessly about Nardelli’s own performance. “He would always say, ‘What am I doing that I need to do better?’ ” In 1988, Welch refused to give Nardelli, then a manufacturing VP, a general management job. Nardelli quit. “The issue is not between you and I,” he told Welch when Welch tried to persuade him to stay. “It is what is between you and I.” Nardelli didn’t get the grammar right (a perception that he’s inarticulate marked his image early on at GE), but his point was that he needed a business to run to prove he was a worthy contender for CEO of GE.

Nardelli spent the next three years as an executive vice president at Wisconsin-based industrial-equipment maker Case, where he ran the worldwide parts and then the construction divisions. He returned to GE in 1991 to run the company’s appliance business in Canada–and was on the CEO track at last. Within the year, Nardelli got the top job at GE Transportation, where he showed the right stuff. In three years he pacified hostile unions, modernized the product line, expanded into services, took the business global, and more than doubled profits. He …globe trotted all the time. “He was everywhere getting orders–Africa, Mexico, China, Eastern Europe,” says GE alum Larry Johnston, who has known Nardelli for 20 years and is now CEO of food retailer Albertson’s.

…In 1995 he left Transportation to become CEO of GE Power Systems; he completed 50 acquisitions and increased profits nearly sevenfold in five years. “Jack and I used to marvel at his ability to execute,” says Bill Conaty, GE’s human resources chief. “With Bob, it’s very, very difficult to have a surprise, because he’s into the details down to the level of the shop floor.”

Jack Welch said Robert Nardelli never missed his targets and that he never made a significant mistake. Why did he pick Jeff Immelt instead? Welch’s only explanation was “It was my call, and I had to go with my gut.”

Recall that Mike Hampton didn’t win the Cy Young award in 2000. The Cy Young goes to only one pitcher in each league, and Hampton was up against Randy Johnson. It could have gone either way, but those who “had the call” picked Johnson.

So Nardelli and Johnson were runner-ups. In both cases, plenty of spoils awaited those who came in a close second. Especially as the Nasdaq was hovering at 4,000…

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Mike Hampton struck gold in December of 2000 when he signed a contract for $121M.   Though he flopped  over those 8 subsequent years, he got to keep his $121M.

As disclosed yesterday, Mike had a twin by the name of Rob.  Depending on one’s perspective, Rob was an abbreviation for either Robert or Robber.

Robert Nardelli was probably too busy to notice Hampton, but it turned out their lives were following a parallel path.  Robert, you see, was coming off his best seasons in 2000.  Like Mike, he was becoming a free agent.   With the Nasdaq up to 4,000, he was as sought after as Mike Hampton.  And like Mike, Robert signed one of the largest contracts in corporate history.

Mike Hampton made $121,000,000 over the subsequent 8 years.  Over these same eight years, Robert “earned” almost exactly double–$240,000,000.

CNBC gave Nardelli the #17 slot on the “Worst American CEOs Ever” list.  If ESPN did a “Worse Sports Contracts Ever”, I’d expect to see Hampton at #17.

Bearonbusiness readers posted several comments on the Mike Hampton series.  Some of these dismissed the analogy.  Most sports franchises aren’t owned by public companies–so the situation is different!  Baseball owners are driven by ego–they don’t care about creating value!  If the owners gave Mike too much money, it is their own fault!  They should have known better.  A baseball player’s career ends at such a young age–they need to get all they can get before their career ends!  (How much career do you think the 54-year-old Nardelli would have when, eight years into his contract, he’d be 62 years old?)

Let’s spend a little time understanding Nardelli’s situation.  It will help us have a more thoughtful discussion on corporate governance.  After all, Home Depot’s board of directors certainly thought they were doing the right thing for their shareholders in December of 2000.  So did the Colorado Rockies.

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Last week I told the story of Mike Hampton.   In 2000, he emerged as one of the best pitchers in baseball.   Great timing–it was becoming a free agent just as the Nasdaq hit its all time high.  After being guaranteed $121M over 8 years–the biggest contract in sports history–he imploded.  During his contract, he lost almost as many games as he won.

Is anyone or anything to blame?  If so, who or what? Before answer this, I want to share another biography.  You see, Mike Hampton had a twin.   His name is Rob.

Rob is not an identical twin of Mike Hampton.  Nor is he a fraternal twin.  In fact they were born 24 years apart.

One was born in Florida, the other in Pennsylvania.

Mike, as we learned, was a star baseball player.  I don’t know if Rob even played sports.

Rob has a masters degree in business.  I don’t know if Mike even went to college.

I don’t know if Rob and Mike ever met.  If they haven’t, they should look each other up.  They’d certainly have plenty to talk about.   As an icebreaker, they could try “How does your life change when you receive $100,000,000’s that most people think you didn’t earn”.

Mike and Rob’s careers peaked at exactly the same time.  Mike Hampton, we learned, struck gold in December, 2000, when he signed his $121M contract.   Rob also struck gold in December, 2000–and his gold mine turned out to be bigger than Mike’s.  Just like Mike, Rob spent eight years attempting to satisfy those expectations others  had of him in 2000.

Oh, and like Mike, Rob turned out to be a colossal flop.

Do I have your attention?  To be continued….

(Happy Birthday to my Irish Twin Bob Caruso…  maybe he reading this.)

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Today I will finish the story  Mike Hampton.    Mark Cuban must nod approvingly of the timing that the lefty had.  This is part of my series on “Failures in Corporate Governance” .

Early in his career, Hampton was a reliable pitcher.  As the Nasdaq rallied from 1,500 to 4,000, Mike posted a 37-14 record in the two years before his contract expired.

Who doesn’t need a lefty who is entering the prime of his career and whose track record is as solid as a rock?  Hampton is worth his weight in gold–and should he get paid what he is worth.  Attendance.  TV ratings.  Jerseys.  Post season.  Ego.  When the Nasdaq jumps another 2,500, today’s contract will be a bargain.

On December 9, 2000,  the Colorado Rockies signed Hampton to the largest contract in the history of sports history at the time.  Mike would receive $121,000,000 over eight years–an average of $15,125,000 a year. And the owners of the Colorado Rockies were smiling ear to ear.

Wikipedia helps describe his 8 year jouney:

Hampton went a disappointing 14–13 with a 5.12 ERA in 2001, his pitching clearly affected by Coors Field.  Hampton succumbed to control problems.  The next season was even more of a disaster for the highly-paid Hampton, as he went 7–15 with his ERA climbing to 6.15.

In November 2002, Hampton and his contract were traded to the Florida Marlins, then to the Atlanta Braves.   Braves’ pitching coach Leo Mazzone set about trying to get Hampton’s career back on track after the Coors Field debacle. Hampton won 14 games and got his ERA back down to 3.84 in 2003.  He overcame a slow start in 2004 by winning 10 of his last 11 decisions and helping to propel the Braves to another division championship.

Hampton did not contribute nearly as much in 2005 as he was limited heavily by injuries. He went 5–3 in twelve starts, but was lost for the rest of the season with an elbow injury on August 19, 2005.  Hampton had Tommy John surgery on September 25, 2005 and missed the entire 2006 season rehabbing.

The Braves were hoping for Hampton to be ready to rejoin the rotation in time for the start of the 2007 season.  The rehab was on schedule until Hampton tore his oblique muscle on March 7, 2007, which was to sideline him until at least May. After Hampton threw a bullpen session on April 8, the Braves shut Hampton down due to recurring elbow pain and said that he would see Dr. David Altchek, who had performed his Tommy John surgery in 2005.  The next day, it was announced after having another left elbow procedure, that Hampton would miss the entire 2007 season.

Hampton began a rehab assignment on November 22, 2007 for Navojoa of the Mexican Winter League.  Before the second inning, feeling discomfort in his hamstring.

On April 3, 2008, Hampton was scheduled to make his long-anticipated return to the Braves rotation in a game against the Pittsburgh Pirates.  While warming up, however, Hampton strained his left pectoral muscle, and was placed on the 15-day disabled list.

Finally, on July 26, 2008, Hampton made his first major league start since August 2005 against the Philadelphia Phillies.

On August 5th, 2008, following two mediocre starts in his return to the majors, Hampton earned his first victory in nearly three years against the San Francisco Giants.  However, he was soon injured again, and finished the season with only 13 appearances. His final 2008 stats included a 3-4 record and a 4.85 ERA.

So there you have it.   Mike Hampton went 56-52 for his $122M.  He was 8-7 in the final 4 years.   I’ll spare you the calculations of dollars per win.

A whole lot of shareholder value was destroyed.  Who or what was to blame? Perhaps government could step in and attend to this disaster…

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Today I will continue the story  Mike Hampton, a baseball pitcher with timing rivals that of Mark Cuban.  It is part of my series on “Failures in Corporate Governance”.  I will not use quotes–but the info below is sometimes quoted or paraphrased from Wikipedia.

Hampton, you’ll recall from yesterday, got off to a solid start in his career.  Then, in the two years that preceded free agency, he became one of the best pitchers in baseball.  The year was 2000.  The telecom and .com boom were in full gear.  Oh, Mike, way to time the market!!!

Lots of guys can throw a fastball.  Not too many are southpaws with a combined 37-14 record over the past two seasons.   Oh, the bump in attendance and TV ratings.  Oh, the jerseys this guy will sell.  Oh, a guy like this will propel his team to the post season–and the team owners will get a financial windfall.

For those owners who can swim in their money, Mike Hampton offered something more.   The lefty will make their team a winner.   A championship will bring an adrenaline rush akin to that felt by an Kentucky Derby horse owner.   So what’s the harm in stretching a bit.  After all, a team won’t be the best unless it has the best talent.

So along come the Colorado Rockies.  The franchise in ready to take the team to a new level.  With Hampton, they will become an elite baseball team.  With Hampton, they will achieve greatness.  Yes, Mike Hampton will take the Colorado Rockies to the promised land.

Oh, did I forget to mention that Mike was just beginning the prime of his career.   The Rockies brass, knowing this, decided they’d lock Mike up for years to come.

So on December 9, 2000,  the Colorado Rockies signed Hampton to the largest contract in the history of sports history at the time.  Mike would receive $121,000,000 over eight years–an average of $15,125,000 a year.

And the Colorado Rockies–this investment would produce riches beyond their wildest imaginations.

BTW, the Nasdaq was around 4,000 when Hampton signed his contract.   Two years prior to Mike’s happy moment, the Nasdaq was at 1,500.  Two years after Mike’s day of joy, the Nasdaq touched 1,200.

…to be continued…

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Today I am going to tell the story of a baseball pitcher by the name of Mike Hampton.  It is part of my series on “Failures in Corporate Governance.”   I will not use quotes–but the info below is either quoted or paraphrased from Wikipedia.

After being drafted in the fifth round of 1990, Mike Hampton broke into the major leagues with the Seattle Mariners in 1993.  The next year, he was traded to the Houston Astros.

In his first 6 seasons, he was a respectable 48 – 39.  Then, in 1999, Hampton had his best year. His 22–4 record was best in the National League.  He narrowly finished second in National League Cy Young Award voting to Randy Johnson.

The next year was the final year of Hampton’s contract.  He was traded to the New York Mets and went 15–10 with a 3.12 ERA and helped the Mets win the National League pennant.   With two wins and no earned runs in two starts, Hampton was named the MVP of the 2000 NLCS.

Talk about great timing.  Two best years coincide with Hampton becoming a free agent.  And its the .com/telecom boom.  Money’s flowing.  Economy booming.  Who doesn’t need a pitcher in the prime of his career whose track record is as solid as a rock?  Hampton is worth his weight in gold–and should he get paid what he is worth.  After all, this is America.

….to be continued….

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As I spoke to yesterday, I believe corporate governance failures are at the root of the economic meltdown.  From yesterday’s post:

The issue is complex and perplexing.  After all, most boards are trying to do the right thing for their shareholders–and nearly all board members are highly educated and have great track records.   I don’t have complete answers–so a lot of what I will write is intended to frame the debate.

Much is written about excessive executive pay.    Rightfully so.    Companies are failing, yet executives are taking out millions.  No question, something is wrong.  However, to what extent is the problem (a) the amount executives are making versus (b) the circumstance that they are making it?

To flush out this question, I look at other industries.  Professional Sports, Entertainment, and (in honor of President Obama) Best Seller Writers.  In each of these industries, the best of the best make countless millions.  And 100,000’s of others make almost nothing.  Yet this is accepted.

Why?  That is, why isn’t anyone questioning the fairness of Obama earned his ga’zillions as a writer?  What about Tom Cruise and Jim Carey getting $25M per movie?   What about Alex Rodriguez’ 10 year, $275M contract that was signed in 2007?

The A-Rod example likely triggered a different reaction.    A-Rod tested positive for steroids–a fact that was unknown when he signed his contract.   He cheated.  Yet he is keeping his $275M.   Does this trigger similar emotions to recent executive pay disclosures?

Does it bother you that Warren Buffett and Bill Gates are the two richest guys in the world?  Does it bother you that the Google executive team is worth billions of dollars per person?   How does your reaction change when you see the following headline:

Freddie Mac CEO got $19.8 million in 2007:  Company loses half its value, but Syron could get $20M in stock awards

Or:

AIG bonuses: $235 million to go;  Troubled insurer AIG has asked the government’s ‘pay czar’ to review hundreds of millions more in bonus payments to employees of its most crippled division

So back to my question:  To what extent is the executive pay problem (a) the amount executives are making versus (b) the circumstance that they are making it?

to be continued

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Rob Powell’s post More Monkey Business by Icahn at XO on Friday covered recent disclosures made by XO.  I am familiar with two recent processes where corporate governance appeared questionable.   Two large public companies own telecom subsidiaries.  They desire to divest them.  The management of these telecom divisions would like to purchase their spun-out business units.   In both cases, other parties have expressed interest in bidding on the properties–but management blocked out other bidders.

Consider the broader events of the past two years.   Late last week it was disclosed that numerous people at bailed-out institutions are receiving >$1M bonuses.   This is on top of the stories that leaked out in recent months about the multi-million bonus and severance packages being paid out to people at failed businesses.

I view the failures in corporate governance to be the core issue of the economic meltdown.  (Government failures is a close second.)   However, the issue is complex and perplexing.  Afterall, most boards are trying to do the right thing for their shareholders–and most board members are competent.  I don’t have complete answers–so a lot of what I will write is intended to frame the debate.

The series will start with a discussion about how much baseball all-stars, movie stars, and bestseller writers (e.g., Barack Obama) make.  My point will be that we need to distinguish between two questions:  is the problem that executives make too much?   or is it that the circumstances in which executives make a lot are the crux of the problem?

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I have been a traveling mad-man the past three weeks.  Over a 14 day period, I’ve been in NYC, Chicago, and London.  What a combination.  There is nothing better than watching a Yankees game in their new $1B ballpark.  Except for watching two Cubs games in the nostalgic Wrigley Field.   Even better is playing whiffle ball in Central Park and Grant Park.   I had a chance to play in both while in NYC and Chicago.

While in London, I caught up with some old friends, including Brady Rafuse.  Brady introduced us to his folks at euNetworks, leaving us excited with the company’s potential.   Not surprisingly, it turned into a late night.  Realizing I didn’t have a blog post ready for tomorrow–and after last night didn’t feel like writing one–I decided that Brady’s blog post could use a reprint.   In Brady’s famous blog called “myblog“, he shared with us his fashion design secrets:

I like Tommy Bahama black shirts. I like them because they don’t crease and they are comfortable. It’s not like a cult thing. I do wear other shirts. But, all things being equal, if I am going to work and I am not seeing a customer and it’s not 90 degrees +, I will be wearing a black suit with a black Tommy Bahama shirt.

Size Medium. Yep, I know I am not medium. Tommy does too. But he knows I feel better buying medium instead of XL. J Lindberg really get this. Lindberg now realise that the amateur golfers who will buy their products look a look more like Angel Cabrera than Camilo Villegas. As such I have a medium Lindberg golf polo from this year that is actually bigger than an XXL from three years ago. Clothiers have really got their head around this, and it really is nicer buying 34” jeans than 38” ..

If you buy a gigE connection from euNetworks, you might want to check the throughput.

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